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costs;especiallyinthesedomainsbusinessesmayoptforabilateralbargainingprotocol.
The sales of information goods, with its virtually unlimited supply, provide a particu-
larly good example of an application domain where businesses may opt for bilateral
bargaining.
Potentially, bargaining can lead to unsatisﬁed customers if buyers perceive the out-
comes of the negotiations as unfair. This can occur when, for instance, two customers
obtain similar goods at the same time but end up paying very different amounts. Fair-
ness of negotiation outcomes is important for customer satisfaction, which in turn may
be important for a business’ long term proﬁtability. The seller agent can prevent unfair
outcomes by incorporating a fairness norm, comparable to the notion of envy-freeness
in auctions [1], whereby customers are treated in a similar fashion. This fairness aspect
emphasizes that bargaining is really one-to-many.
The challenge is to develop bargaining strategies for the seller agent that maximize
overall revenue by utilizing differences in buyers’ willingness to pay without violating
the fairness constraint. In this paper we focus on strategies that can utilize differences in
customers’ time pressure. For the case of virtually unlimited supply, as for information
goods, we present a number of one-to-many bargaining strategies for the seller, which
take into account the fairness constraint and bargain over multiple attributes. In order to
beneﬁt from time pressure, these strategies specify—in addition to an actual (counter)
proposal or an acceptance proposal—when to respond to an opponent’s proposal. We
compare the performance of the bargaining strategies using an evolutionary simulation,
especially for the case of impatient buyers and small (exogenous) probability (per ne-
gotiation round) of a customer breaking off the negotiations. One set of strategies, the
so-called “responsive threshold” strategies, are able to extract almost all the surplus,
given sufﬁcient time pressure. These strategies beneﬁt from the fact that the setting
is one-to-many, even though bargaining occurs in a bilateral fashion. In addition, the
strategies are able to ﬁnd win-win agreements (i.e., very little Pareto improvement is
possible).
A number of related papers study bargaining using an evolutionary approach,
e.g. [2–5]. Our approach extends previous research to multiple (types of) buyers and
bilateral negotiation strategies for one-to-many multi-issue bargaining which can ben-
eﬁt from time pressure. In addition a growing body of literature exists on multi-issue
negotiation, which focus on developing techniques a seller and/or a buyer can use to
determine the relative magnitude of the various issues and consequently search for ap-
proximately win-win (or Pareto-efﬁcient) deals [6–9]. Although we also consider the
problem of how to determine the values for the various attributes of an offer, the focus
of the paper lies on the development of “threshold” strategies for one-to-many negoti-
ation. These strategies determine the desired utility level of a deal and can be used in
conjunction with the techniques already developed in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the
bargaining setting and introduce strategies for one-to-many bargaining. In Section 3 we
discuss the simulation environment used for testing the performance of the strategies.
We present the simulation results of the conducted computer experiments in Section 4.
Conclusions follow in Section 5.